

The need for a sustainable regulation of economic immigration: an application to the case of France

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Abstract

In view of a globalization which accentuates the geographical polarization of activities, migratory flows are destined to develop throughout the world. The European Union is concerned by this phenomenon in an economic context marked in many countries by the existence of mass unemployment which often concerns a factor of low-skilled labour. Immigration in several countries of the European Union, particularly in France, is of low qualifications. In this country, the level of disqualified work appears too high which necessitates a new migration policy in the direction of exclusively skilled labour to promote a new industrial dynamism. This must be determined at national level, the relevant level of subsidiarity.

Keywords : migration, unemployment, European Union, French economy, immigration policy

1. Introduction

Population movements cannot be explained solely by political conflicts. They are also the result of endemic underdevelopment in a number of regions of the world (Africa, Asia and Latin America). That said, the distinction between political refugees and economic migrants is not always easy to establish. On the one hand, the two concepts can overlap insofar as political refugees can be led to work in the host country and, on the other hand, economic migrants, by far the most numerous, can be attempts to use the channels reserved for political migrants to reach the targeted territories. It is very clear today that migrants from the Middle East and Libya to the European Union have multiple status: political refugee, economic migrant, islamist terrorist. The checks required at points of entry into European territory (Greece and Italy in particular) are generally regarded as deficient. The problem of

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
political refugees raises no difficulty in that they must be welcomed throughout the democratic world (preferably in countries bordering on the areas where they are excluded), as much as that of economic migrants raises real questions to which they cannot be limited to humanitarian or moral considerations. The economic, social and societal situation of host countries must be assessed in order to determine their capacity to absorb the flows of economic migrants satisfactorily, avoiding, in particular, the pitfalls of communitarianism. Our contribution aims to pose the problem of Euro-African economic migration for a country like France. Let us first look at the global productive context that affects the migratory pattern.

2. A non-innovative global productive paradigm which consolidating international economic divergence

The industrial productive paradigm is in crisis today insofar as, in the absence of major innovations, it is obliged to supply almost the same goods whose manufacture is distributed worldwide, the Asian zone being the main area of manufacturing. There appears to be a context of stationary economies: in spite of technical progress, activities, in particular industrial ones, are not renewed sufficiently and induced economic growth tends to become weaker, even in emerging countries. More or less confusingly, the people feel it and the lack of economic results and prospects leads to social difficulties which, according to the countries, create or accentuate a despair that can turn into major political crises (rise of the national affirmation In Europe, a political crisis that is hidden or open in several Mediterranean or African countries). One of the major issues then becomes the safeguarding of civil peace. On the one hand, it is therefore urgent to take as realistic as possible the measure of the problems facing our societies and, on the other hand, to stimulate new, sustainable dynamics of cooperation, (acting against the conformism of our institutions - conception and action-, the conservation or the development of unjustified benefits, the corruption, etc.).

The globalization of activities is in fact a heightened regionalization of trade and, in terms of trade (Figure 1 and Figure 2), there is a marginalization of entire continents in the current international division of labour (Africa, Latin America). It should also be noted that no country in Africa has yet reached the stage where internal growth begins to reduce emigration.

Figure 1. Merchandise trade of WTO members by region, 2005-2015 (percentage share, %)




Asia, Europe and North America have accounted for 88% in total merchandise trade of WTO members over the past ten years. The share of developing economies in merchandise exports increased from 33% in 2005 to 42% in 2015.

Figure 2. Economies by size of merchandise trade, 2015



The top ten merchandise traders accounted for 52% of the world’s total trade in 2015 and Developing economies had a 42% share in world merchandise trade in 2015. As regards participation in the provision of services (Figure 3), the situation is relatively more favourable, especially for the Maghreb and East and Southern Africa. On the other hand, for Sub-Saharan Francophone Africa, despite the undoubted potential advantages of traditional services (tourism), this zone is the world's weakest producer.

Figure 3. Economies by size of trade in commercial services, 2015




Exports of commercial services by WTO members totalled US\$ 4,68 trillion in 2015

The top ten traders in commercial services accounted for 53% of the world’s total trade in 2015 and developing economies accounted for 36% of total trade in commercial services in 2015.


As for foreign direct investment, the situation is no more favorable for the marginalized continents in international trade, both in terms of stocks and inward flows (Figures 4 and 5). But Africa is the world zone least affected by FDI from the rest of the world. In the short period of 2011-2016, the relatively low inflows were marked stagnation.

Figure 4 -Trends in inward FDI flows by major world regions (2011-2016)



More decisively, over a long period (2000-2016), FDI stocks mainly concern the major poles of globalization: North America, Europe and Asia (China in particular). Latin America and the Caribbean received more FDI than Africa, which remains the least attractive area for foreign investment. This is a worrying situation for the economic development of this continent.

Figure 5 - Inward FDI stock by major world regions (2000-2016)



Then a question arises: what possible economic development for marginalized areas in today's globalization? One knows only too well: the Institutions, partly to justify their legitimacy, tend to present statistical situations rather favourable to their actions and policies. Thus, the African Development Bank, in support of Africa's powerful and perennial economic development, has recently established that the middle class is expanding. To assess it, the institution considered that the perception of a daily income between 2 and 20 dollars was enough to define the membership of this middle class. This would reach nearly 370 million people among the continent's 1.1 billion people, or 34%. This figure, often considered overvalued, makes it possible to envisage an important development of the consumer society. However, this prospect is likely to remain an illusion if simultaneously we do not envisage how to develop the production society on this continent. "We are still too attached to the colonial power. We must cut the umbilical cord" said Alpha Condé, Chairman of the African Union, on Wednesday, March 29, 2017, in Abidjan, on the occasion of the International Conference on the Emergence of Africa. This was aimed at the African policy of France according to the usual and hollow rhetoric of guilt of the former colonial power. Indeed, it no longer has any real

impact on the evolution of the conditions of production of its former colonies. However, Africa is still fairly globally a continent exporting raw materials and low value-added products. In the absence of adequate infrastructure, innovation, education and skills adapted to its workforce, we don't see how the global productive model could mutate and change the status of this continent in the international division of labour. As a result, economic migration to more developed and prosperous regions, including the countries of the European Union, will continue to affect it in the future.

The contemporary evolution of the international division of labour accentuates the major role of firms in relation to States in the development of global value chains (GVC). The productive processes are less and less exclusively national. Even small firms (start-ups) can participate in international trade by supplying components instead of a final product. In this context, the WTO became an institution more suited to regulation between States than to a relevant regulation for the transnational division of labour (Bali meeting, December 2013). Consequently, international commercial integration tends to evolve with the affirmation of closer interstate cooperation: emergence of a renewed regionalism around an extension of the natural exchange zone with the Transpacific Partnership or the Transatlantic Partnership for Trade and Investment. Regional standards in the framework of large free trade agreements (driven by the United States) would be called upon to become later new WTO rules (new standardization of products and services, recourse to private arbitral tribunals in case of conflict States - private investors, etc.).

In this new context in which the WTO loses its capacity to directly regulate globalization, Euro-African relations suffer from a structural handicap, necessitating the definition of new cooperation strategies: on the one hand, exports from the African countries, which are essentially oriented towards the European Union, are favorising the blocking of their specialization on goods with low added value to the detriment of diversification, and, on the other hand, the fragmentation of their regional markets, despite the existence of regional integration entities (but very low intra-area trade), which prevents the exploitation of possible economies of scale. Such fragmentation creates transaction costs between the economies of the Mediterranean countries that are higher than transaction costs between the economies of the Mediterranean countries and the European Union. Clearly, cross-sectoral economic relations between Mediterranean and African countries are not sufficiently developed, which hinders the future of this zone in its participation in the GVC. Despite the existence of several free trade agreements between the countries on the southern shore, the strengthening of lasting economic relations through industrial coproduction actions is linked to the diversification and productive development axes that these countries wish to promote. Morocco, for example, is ready to share its industrial policy and regional development priorities with the Emergence Plan, but this is not the case for several countries on the southern shore (Tunisia, Egypt, most countries in sub-Saharan Africa). Mutually beneficial industrial coproductions have their best chance of success when the sector concerned is not in difficulty or when there are not underutilized productive capacities (pharmacy, mechanics, aeronautics and transport). These partnerships must be tackled before the sector is forced

to adjust its workforce to its activity (for example, the French textile industry affected by the crisis did not anticipate sufficiently the end of the Multifibre Agreement, unlike Germany)¹. New industrial dynamics are likely to encounter structural difficulties: standardization and traceability for access to European markets; economies outside the European Union with little banking; industrial and commercial public services weakly developed; production units involving the mastery of technologies and suffering from a lack of management capacity, etc.).

The services sector, on the other hand, offers new opportunities for North / South cooperation, both in terms of traditional services (transport, tourism) and new services, notably in the financial and insurance sectors. More generally, business services are expected to undergo new growth in the context of sustainable development (in the case of non-fossil or renewable energies). In any case, the new axes of productive cooperation will take place within a constrained framework of technical progress, that of creativity limited to minor innovations (despite advances in robotization, nanotechnology, etc.).

The evolution of production conditions inevitably raises the issue of the allocation of factorial resources (labour, capital, technical progress in a broad sense) and their regional mobility. Demographic trends show that, in the three countries of the central Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia), the fertility rates of these countries are similar to those of the European countries at the most dynamic birth rate: for the year 2015, with the exception of Algeria, where the fertility rate rose again to 3, Morocco and Tunisia recorded rates of 2.13 and 1.99 (France, 2.08 In 2015), which barely permits the renewal of the population whose aging rate increases. Consequently, in the medium term, the macroeconomic cost of this demographic stabilization (education, vocational training, etc.) is expected to decline and to weigh less on the public finances of these countries, allowing more funding for economic development actions. The situation is less favorable in sub-Saharan Africa, where fertility rates are not sufficiently under control (by 2015, Cameroon: 5.3, Niger: 6, Mali: 6). Education of the population is of course a fundamental condition for future economic success. The quality of training will depend on the innovation performance and the capacity of the different economies to absorb it. From this point of view, many countries of the European Union and especially from Africa have marked inadequacies in education. On the other hand, labour mobility and migration, provided that they are properly organized and regulated in a bilateral (possibly regional) partnership framework, can contribute to the emergence of more efficient economies

The relative economic sluggishness in the European Union calls for new regulations and a change in the institutional structure of Europe towards a more realistic configuration² to the detriment of a federal Europe, impossible to date. Otherwise, Europe will defeat (what it has begun to do with the Brexit). A new economic dynamic must be fostered in the European Union, which could be based

¹ Report of the study mission on the possibilities of long-term industrial partnership with certain Mediterranean countries, Cgefi, Ministry of Economy, Industry and Digital, Paris, 2013.

² An Europe of projects accompanying a temporary discretion of the role of integration institutions or “*Europe à la carte*”.

in particular on an enhancement of sustainable cooperation towards the south of the Mediterranean. How can the phenomenon of economic migration evolve in this constrained economic context in which the Euro-African productive process appears relatively fixed and not very dynamic? This question will be analyzed on the basis of economic immigration concerning a country such as France, which is confronted with a major problem in this area because of its colonial past.

3. The characteristics of economic immigration in France


This question is most often approached from a macroeconomic point of view, whereas it would probably be more appropriate to deal with it in a micro-economic approach (there are not two identical economic migrants!) . The global analysis often leads to the addition of different situations, thus revealing the limits of aggregated statistical or analytical characterization. The issue of immigration is not always adequately addressed: empirical studies are often partial and evaluations are frequently accompanied by value judgments. Let us first introduce the study of the theoretical effects of labour migration.

3.1. Economic analysis of the effects of immigration.

From a theoretical point of view, we can refer to the neoclassical economic analysis of the effects of migration and to the more heterodox approaches of this phenomenon (dualism of the international labour market or marxist analysis).

3.1.1. The neo-classical approach

Figure 4 below shows the effects of labour mobility in a neo-classical framework.



Originally, a L1O level of workers is employed in the domestic economy and a L1O * level is utilized in the foreign economy. The real wage is lower in the domestic country (point C) than in the foreign country (point B). Workers migrate from the domestic economy to the foreign country until equalization of real wages. This very abstract model, favouring the production variable, leads to the assertion that legal immigration is always beneficial for the host country. From a production perspective, the same conclusion can be drawn with regard to illegal immigration. However, it is clear that this analysis is partial because it only takes into account one dimension of immigration: the production. What are the other effects of this new productive dynamic? We can see a convergence of real wages because they fall in the foreign country and rise in the domestic country. World production is increasing in this model with only two countries. Its amount is ABC (the domestic production declines from a level ACL1L2 and the foreign production increases for a level AB L1L2). Finally, there are winners and losers, the game is not zero-sum. Workers in the domestic country (whether migrant or non-migrant) ultimately receive a higher wage and foreign workers see their real wages decline.

Thus, the neo-classical theory shows a gain for the host country of the immigrant workforce. This result is obtained under restrictive assumptions which are not always true, especially in the case of mass unemployment, which is found in many countries of the euro area, in France in particular. The Eurozone comprises a group of countries characterized by irreducible domestic productive divergences, a situation partly attributable to a single currency which is not suitable for all member states. As a result, these countries cannot have a homogeneous migration policy: the interests of countries such as France do not coincide with those of Germany. The Schengen agreements have shown their limits by not allowing an effective regulation of labour flows at the entrance of the European Union (the Posted workers directive having its own inefficiency in intra-European social dumping). According to us, the relevant regulation can only be carried out at the national level, which alone allows precise and better controlled planning of the needs of immigrant labour in line with the evolution of national productive tissues (coordination or harmonization of migrating rules eventually by agreements between European countries).

3.1.2. Heterodox explanations

The first explanation highlights the dualism of the international labour market by emphasizing other mechanisms for explaining workforce global movements. For example, a decisive role can be given to the demand for work from host-country firms. Immigration is not caused by repulsive factors in the countries of origin (low wages or high unemployment), but by attractive factors in the host countries (a sustainable need of foreign workers). Thus, in the host countries, hierarchies of wages are also hierarchies of prestige (Cerc, 1999). When firms want to attract workers

for jobs at the bottom of the scale, they cannot act by raising wages. Why ? The rise in the lowest salaries may create strong pressures for a similar increase in wages at other levels of the hierarchy. As a result, a structural inflation may occur, creating then a strong incentive to use foreign workers, initially not sensitive to the social status requirements of host societies. Immigrants are *target earners*, workers seeking a specific objective (to obtain an income to realize a real estate project, buy a business in the country of origin, etc.). They are therefore more likely to occupy the jobs of host societies considered unattractive.

The second explanation is an approach by the economy-world (marxist analysis): the destructuring of societies in the South through colonialism and neocolonialism reveals a labour force that will supply the labour markets of the countries of the North. This explanatory scheme is somewhat simplistic in that, on the one hand, the southern states are today independent and can choose the nature of their relations with the former colonial powers whose economic and political weight has considerably regressed over time of the time and, on the other hand, international financial capitalism, which controls the whole economic sphere, has effects of labour selection inside all the countries of the planet.

3.2. Immigration in the facts in France

A. Edo (2016) has established that migrants are mainly from the countries of the South and they go half to the countries of the North. In economic migration, we must question the degree of qualification of the migrant labour force. What is a skilled workforce? In reality, the concept is vague. The level of diplomas obtained is not necessarily a relevant criterion for many reasons: educational systems are of very variable quality, know-how and competence are not always linked to the level of diplomas obtained, etc.

3.2.1. The importance of the migratory phenomenon in France


As regards the distribution of migrants, it can be said that in France, according to the 2010 census, 60% of immigrants are divided into three regions: 38.6% reside in the *Ile de France*, 11% in the *Rhône-Alpes* and 9% in the *PACA*. Moreover, they are less numerous in other French regions: less than 1% of the local population in *Basse-Normandie* or *Corse*. Immigrants concentrate in the regions where the best employment opportunities exist (*Île de France*) and also have the specificity of grouping the former generations of migrants who had previously chosen them for their economic dynamism. This geographical polarization of migratory flows originated from the same foreign territories contributes to the ghettoization of these populations and the development of communitarianism. This can also lead to the effects of political patronage which encourages some

elected representatives to favour the increase in migratory flows, irrespective of any economic need in this field, or to encourage more or less explicitly communitarian practices.

Over a long period from 1895 to 2010, the proportion of foreign-born foreigners rose from 2.5% to 8.5% in France. Their weight in the population tripled over a period of a century. The proportion of immigrants and sons of immigrants in the 25-54 years age group represents 26.6% of the population, which over a long period makes France the first host country in Europe, ahead of the United-Kingdom. They perceive a lot of social assistance, revealing a relatively low degree of qualification of this workforce. In 2009, indeed, in terms of the share of social assistance in the family income, compared to non-immigrant households whose social aids accounted for 4.4% of their income, the share of the immigrant households was 6.6 % for immigrants from the European Union, 18% for immigrants from outside the European Union and the Africa (up to 20.2% for those from the Maghreb and 24.2% for those from the rest of Africa). These statistics show unequivocally that immigration from Africa is of a rather low level of qualification which results in the granting of low income, what justifies social aids. This type of workforce must see its proportion decline in the French productive apparatus, failing which the industrial renovation of the country (with a goal of increasing the range of productions) will be hampered and no improvement of the balance of current transactions of the country will cannot be envisaged.

In the more recent period of the last thirty years, data from INED and INSEE (Figures 5 and 6) show that since 1982 the share of immigrants in the population has increased by 1.2 percentage points and that of foreigners decreased by 0.5 percentage points.


Figure 5. Share of immigrants and foreigners in the population for 30 years in France



Source : INED

In 2008, one third of immigrants came from EU countries, 42.5% came from Africa and the Maghreb, 14.2% from Asia and 5.3% from America or Oceania. Colonization and the appeal to immigrant workers in the 1960s explain the large share of immigrants from the Maghreb.


Figure 6. Immigrants are mostly native from the Maghreb and the EU - Year 2011



Source : INSEE

Figure 7 below summarizes the French immigration and nationality situation for almost a century. It can be seen that, since the 1920s, the share of Frenchs by birth fell by 3.8 percentage points and that of immigrants increased by 3 percentage points. The structure of the population in terms of nationality seems to have changed little. Let us indicate nevertheless that over time it has been recorded in the natives French people, the French people by acquisition of the nationality ... In reality, the French-born block has been highly diversified over time, with a significant increase in the non-European population.

Figure 7. Evolution of immigration and nationality since the 1920s



Source : INSEE

According to the angle of analysis, the reality of immigration in France can be understood differently. According to M. Tribalat (2016), a demographer and recognized expert on immigration issues, in 2012, metropolitan France had nearly 4 million foreigners, 5.6 million immigrants, but 12.4 million people of foreign origin over two generations, or 19.6% of the population. The migratory measure over two generations is interesting because it ultimately raises questions about the real feasibility of integration policies or the inevitability of the development of communitarianism. Recent works by M. Tribalat (2013 and 2017) provide a clear answer to this question by showing that the European multiculturalist model, which is in fact a communitarian model, is gradually consolidating. This movement will certainly be amplified and consolidated, on the one hand, by predictable waves of migration from economically marginalized territories in current globalization (Latin America and Africa according to WTO statistics) and, on the other hand, by the inertia of European public authorities, overwhelmed by the magnitude of economic migrations and without a lasting solution other than the generous reception of migrants. This attitude, which is not the result of any serious economic study (industrial needs in terms of manpower, improved pension funding capacity, etc.), does not support the interests of European populations resident insofar as economic immigration from underdeveloped territories is very poorly qualified.

3.2.2. What is the balance sheet of the French migratory phenomenon?

Attempts have been made to try to assess the degree of assimilation of immigrants in Europe (M. Aleksynska, 2010). This is a questionable approach to measuring a qualitative problem, which is poorly defined (what is assimilation?) using a composite quantitative indicator, the similarity index as expressed by A. Manning (2011). In general, the results obtained corroborate the simple elementary empirical observation, which tends to credibilize this quantitative indicator tested by probit regressions. What are the conclusions? First of all, there is a strong proximity between immigrants and natives in economic situation terms, but this is less true in culturally and civically terms. On the other hand, M. Aleksynska's analysis shows that the religious practice of immigrants converges rapidly with that of the natives. This result is surprising and does not seem to corroborate by the facts. Free assertions may also appear: "On the other hand, the need for a perfect socio-cultural similarity, such as the adoption of the official language in the home, is debatable. Indeed, in countries that promote cultural diversity and self-expression, strong and persistent cultural distinctions can mean success rather than failure of integration"(M. Aleksynska, p. 2). This lenient argument seems to us hardly admissible because this situation tends to promote the emergence and consolidation of communitarian and identity affirmations. In this respect, in the present-day France, communitarianism, which is developing clearly in a number of sensitive suburbs (Ile de France, Rhones -Alpes, etc), seems rather to reflect a desire to distance itself from the host society. One can refer to the disturbing analysis of A. Mendel on what he calls *Islamist secession in France* (2017).

Referring to the effects of migration on the labour market and social protection, a mixed picture can be drawn of this phenomenon:

- Immigration in France: what impacts on wages and employment? In France, according to INSEE data, the share of immigrants in the labour force increased from 7% in 1990 to 10% in 2010. In 20 years, the share of highly skilled migrants among immigrant workers has almost tripled (10% in 1990 to 28% in 2010). The number of low-skilled workers fell sharply from 67% to 39%, while remaining at a high level. Nevertheless, these statistical data are very limited in scope insofar as the definition of qualification (a fundamental question that INSEE does not evaluate!) is not clearly established and we insist that it is operational know-how, exploitable by the firms that must be the measuring tool of this qualification (the level of the diploma is no longer a relevant criterion).

The employment of natives may diminish in favour of immigrants when they are forced to accept less favourable conditions of employment. Economic theory tells us that an influx of immigrants induces downward pressure on the wages of native workers to which immigrants can substitute. But if there are wage rigidities, it is the employment rate of the natives that is likely to fall. Moreover, if immigrants can substitute for natives of similar qualification, they are complementary to those with a different qualification. In general, studies do not measure the spatial impact of the influx of immigrants. Indeed, to compensate for a possible deterioration in their conditions of employment due to the arrival of immigrants in the local labour market, natives can change region. The economic and social impact of this mobility is therefore complex. An empirical analysis of A. Edo (2013) showed that when wages are rigid, adjustment is made on the employment rate: a 10% increase in the share of immigrants in a skill class degrades by about 3% the employment of natives with similar individual characteristics in terms of age, training, labour market experience. In France, there are strong wage rigidities due to a minimum wage and very favourable conditions for unemployment compensation. Moreover, the argument that the fragility of immigrant status would lead to a "social overcorrection" that would reduce their propensity to claim an improvement in their conditions is not acceptable. Indeed, the capacity to receive these populations by the trade unions, especially those considered as non-reformists (CGT, Sud, etc.), is high and their claimability is at least as strong as that of the natives.

- Immigration and social protection. The dependency ratio (population aged 65 and over / population aged 14-64) is expected to rise in France from just over 25% in 2000 to about 45% in 2050. A priori, funding conditions for protection therefore be called upon to deteriorate. Can this constitute a strong incentive for the robotization of the productive apparatus rather than a massive immigration which would ultimately not be absorbed by the host country? The question is asked. It should also be noted that most immigrant women in France are mothers (57% of Maghreb women and 65% of non-Maghreb women according to INSEE, compared with 47% of natives) and have more children. More than 8% of the Maghreb and sub-Saharan immigrants have at least four of them, while the indigenous population has less than two. These statistical data underestimate the reality because they do not take

into account the children of migrants born on the national territory, considered as French. Therefore, this high birth rate (3.3 children per woman, compared with 1.9 for natives) could be good news for the pension system, which could reach a deficit of 25 billion euros by 2020. However, it is not enough to have a large number of births. On the one hand, this must also lead to the emergence of a genuinely qualified workforce and, on the other hand, the new supply politics led today by France must to succeed. Thus, this population will be able to access a job, preferably qualified in a high value-added activity. So we are still far of a winning bet!

Immigration contributes in part to maintaining the profitability of firms as foreign staff can be used to perform low-cost, thankless tasks. In some areas such as building, cleaning, personal aids, businesses can operate profitably. It may be added that the process of integration by the economy works less well with immigrants from the Maghreb or sub-Saharan Africa than with the waves of previous immigration. According to INSEE, the average unemployment rate in 2010 was 8.8% for persons whose parents were born in France, 16% for immigrants themselves and 24% for children of foreigners of origin non-European. A society needs workers with various qualifications. Third countries, particularly in Africa, are providing France with a high share of its low-skilled labour force. The problem is that today there are about 6 to 7 million people in this country without work or little employed. A significant proportion of this population is inadequately or poorly qualified (although at times highly graduate). In other words, France has a significant proportion of workers who are unsuitable for labour supply or who refuse to fill vacancies. This creates a high social cost that the economy cannot sustainably finance. Vacant posts must be filled as a matter of priority by using this labour force, de facto poorly qualified rather than a low-skilled immigrant workforce from third countries. However, the situation is completely different if we consider skilled migrants (a fortiori if they are experienced) for whom restrictions on their free movement could be unfavourable to potential host countries.

Finally, in the evaluation of costs, it is necessary to take into account the shortfall for the countries of origin of the immigrant workforce. For example, it can be noted that the rise in unemployment in the North, accompanied by precarious labour market conditions, leads to a reduction in the remittances of migrants to their countries of origin. According to the World Bank, this decline in transfers could have the following consequences: between 55 and 90 million people could fall into the extreme precariousness of which six million in Sub-Saharan Africa.

4. What are the ways of regulating economic immigration?

Regulation in this area can only be carried out at the relevant level of subsidiarity, that is to say, the national State. In the short term, the European Union, which has been unable to prevent the growth of intra-European economic and social disparities (the first beneficiary of the euro zone is by far

Germany, leading to a highly asymmetric Europe) is the subject of a growing distrust among the population of many Member States. Europe appears to be integrated by the Law and increasingly disintegrated by the economy. The sensitive issue of international migration should therefore not be dealt with at this level, especially since so far the European Union has shown some limits in the approach to this problem: external borders of the European Union badly controlled, sub-optimal transmission of information between European migration management services, Schengen system circumvented in multiple ways, etc. That said, state policies are not exempt from inefficiencies: for example, clandestine economic immigration that affects France is partly due to the dysfunction of the national visa policy of this country: some foreigners with a lawfully visa do not return always to their country of origin at his expiry. It's a real problem for France in its relationship, particularly with its former colonies, because the clandestine migratory flow is bound to grow due to the economic underdevelopment that will continue in these territories.


In the short term, the European integration institutions must accompany those Member States which wish to control the flow of population entering their territory. They should also support initiatives based on projects with variable geometry on the model of European successes (such as Airbus or the European Space Agency which are not the creation of integration institutions). Otherwise, there is a great risk that the populations of the Member States in economic and social difficulties express a desire for withdrawal from the European Union. The durability of the European Union therefore makes it necessary a transitional phase of renationalization of sovereign prerogatives such as the free movement of persons. States must conduct labour migration policies that are sustainable, that is to say, strictly linked to the situation of their economy. In case of mass unemployment, the immigration of unskilled labour must be limited or interrupted because the needs of the economy in this area must be met, by resorting first and foremost to unemployed residents who are in any event lacking sufficient qualifications. To that end, the mechanisms of unemployment insurance and social assistance must be reformed to better promote the return to employment immediately available.

Another problem has to be dealt with: the aging of the European population. What is the European situation in terms of intra-area population movement? According to Eurostat, in 2014, a total of 3.8 million people have immigrated to one of the EU-28 Member States and at least 2.8 million emigrants have left the territory of those states. Of these 3.8 million immigrants in 2014, there were an estimated 1.6 million citizens from third countries, 1.3 million people with the nationality of a Member State other than the one in which they immigrated, some 870 000 persons migrated to a Member State of the Union of which they were nationals (for example, nationals returning to the country or born abroad), and about 12 400 stateless persons.

The age pyramids below (Figures 8 and 9) reveal a real aging of the European population. Labour migration does little to alter the shape of the age pyramid of nationals (a narrow base with an


enlargement of the fully active population of 20-50 years). Is it necessary to look for a broad-based age pyramid?

Figure 8 - Age pyramid of national and non-national populations in the EU, 1 January 2015 (1)



This broadening of the base of the age pyramid is not an absolute necessity. It all depends on the mode of production that we want to promote. We can very well envisage an increased robotization of productive processes (a substitution of technical capital for labour), making the increase in the labour factor less necessary. Technology would alleviate the deficit of births and make production less work-related. The residual work would then be more highly qualified. As a result, immigration would no longer be necessary, which would limit the entry of often inadequately qualified workers. From this point of view, the French economy would benefit if it were able to robotize because it no longer resorted to low-skilled immigration. Japan has already embarked on the robotization of its economy to compensate for its birth deficit and the significant aging of its population, resulting in a decline in the working population. This country has made an identitarian choice: to robotize production instead of resorting to labor migration to maintain its social cohesion. This model also implies an increase in the qualification of domestic work, permitted by an efficient educational system, which is the case in Japan.

Figure 9. Age pyramid of immigrants by nationality in the EU - Year 2014 (1)



For France, the situation is different. First, the country faces the structural problem posed by a large share of the current labor force, which is poorly qualified to take up the jobs of the future. This lack of operational know-how stems from the inefficiency of the educational system in a serious performance crisis. Then, innovation in both quantitative and qualitative terms is not sufficient in France, which increases the difficulty of applying the recommendations of the L. Gallois report of 2012 (unskilled immigration is a difficulty, not the main obstacle to the revitalization of the national productive fabric). The French economy remains confronted with two major structural deficits that contribute little by little to its weakening but without economic collapse: that of public finances (budget deficit and public debt) and that of the current account, which indicates a poor integration into the international division of labour. The first type of deficit is relatively easy to solve (it is necessary to reduce public spending) whereas the second is very difficult to absorb in the open economy that France is experiencing today. Indeed, beyond the ephemeral restoration of the competitiveness by the prices, it is necessary to give back to the country a new competitiveness structure which involves considerable efforts in productive investment and innovation, which is not the case today.

5. Conclusion

In summary, our purpose is to draw attention to an economic internationalization which maintains in the marginalization of trade entire continents (Africa and Latin America). These zones, while pursuing their development policy, will not have sufficient economic power in the context of

current globalization to prevent a large emigration of labour to more prosperous regions (Europe in particular). These migratory movements are never win-win. In the case of migrations of skilled workers (the least numerous), the countries of origin are disadvantaged and, in the case of migrations of unskilled workers and mass unemployment in the host countries, these countries are penalized in net terms (firms in receiving countries may be the only beneficiaries). Regulatory policies at the State level appear more relevant to strictly control labour flows by restricting severely the mobility of unskilled labour, that is, without specific know-how.

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